

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 16, 1953

Revisions for SE-43

② ~~franchise would~~
7. ~~A truce in Korea will result in a widespread belief in Japan and Southeast Asia that the major barrier to normal political and economic relations in Asia will have been removed.~~ Therefore, new opportunities will be created for both the Communist bloc and the West in competing for influence in Asia. The degree to which continuation of the Indochina war will undermine the Communist peace posture in Asia will depend importantly, on the Communist ability to foster the Asian belief that it is a "colonial" war and not an instrument of Communist imperialism. While no fundamental shift in the alignment of Asian states is to be expected, a Korean truce would probably create serious problems for the National Government of China and the Republic of Korea. In Japan, while the alignment with the US would continue, there would be strong pressure for the expansion of economic and political relations with Communist China and the USSR. In Southeast Asia, the neutralist governments of Burma and Indonesia would probably support Chinese Communist efforts to gain UN membership.

9. Modify 2nd sentence to read:

"Japan would be ~~parasitic~~ much more receptive to Communist trade offers following a Korean armistice particularly if no other alternative presented itself to ease the serious economic consequences following an anticipated reduction in American military expenditures."

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C (C) 1991
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 10-2
DATE: 3 FEBR '81 REVIEWER: 018557

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

SP-43

Page 2, para 2, 1st sentence - Add at end:

".....", and is probably enhanced by Communist assumption of the initiative in the peace campaign, which serves to accentuate the divergency of the views of the Western nations on the relative importance of individual problems.....
(Then rest of paragraph).

Page 3, para 3, 4th and 5th sentences - Delete and substitute:

"If however, the U. S. in consultation with its allies, and while maintaining a posture of military readiness, could originate concrete proposals for the solution of various issues; or, failing that possibility, appeared willing to negotiate on Communist offers, the non-Communist world would almost certainly remain responsive to U. S. leadership. In the first event the Communists might be put in the position of having to make real concessions to support their peaceful posture, or of refusing to negotiate Western proposals, which in turn would serve to strengthen non-Communist unity and purpose. In the second, such U. S. action would probably lessen the chances of a serious division of opinion between the U. S. and the other Western powers, which is almost certainly a primary aim of the new Communist tactics.

Page 5, para 6 - Add at end:

"Under such circumstances the U. S. might be open to Communist inspired charges of intransigence from its allies, associates, and the neutral nations, unless a agreed Western position had been previously decided and presented"

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

CONFIDENTIAL